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Will States Step Up in 2020? We Hope So
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage

Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of
law at Indiana University Maurer School of
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors express hope that more
states will take advantage of opportunities
under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act by taxing
repatriated income and conforming to the
global intangible low-taxed income and the
base erosion and antiabuse tax regimes.
We offer no predictions about the next year
in tax, but we will offer what we hope will
happen — if not next year, then soon. To
paraphrase Chief Justice John Roberts, we hope
that when it comes to the taxation of
multinational corporations in particular, states
will act more like the “separate and
independent sovereigns” that they are.1
Many of the reasons for a rethink of state
public finance systems have long been noted.
States are bound by balanced budget rules, but

often rely on volatile revenue sources. More
stable tax bases, like the sales tax and the
property tax bases, are riddled with design
flaws, from the sales tax base not including
services and intangibles to the property tax
failing to provide substantial, and automatic,
circuit breakers. The corporate tax continues to
yield less as corporations earn more.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act offered states a
chance to take up the challenges relating to the
corporate tax in particular, but in most cases
2
they have not done so. Take the repatriation. A
sizeable portion of this money should have been
taxed by the states to begin with — not just
because the states also lose when corporations
shift income out of the United States. In
addition, corporations were incentivized by the
likelihood of another federal repatriation
holiday to strip out more income from the
domestic corporate tax base than they might
otherwise. In other words, one piece of poor
federal tax policy (repatriation holidays) was
exacerbating another piece of poor federal tax
policy (the porous corporate tax regime).
There were — and are — additional reasons
to tax the repatriation. For one, the repatriation
was taxed at a bargain rate at the federal level,
then this one-time money was squandered to
pay for permanent tax cuts. A state-level tax
could correct this to some extent. And because
the repatriation also represents an inelastic tax
base, states could resolutely resist the (usually
specious) argument that companies would
move if the state pursued a tax policy that the
companies did not like.

2

1

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 579
(2012).

Most of these arguments are drawn from Darien Shanske and David
Gamage, “Why (and How) States Should Tax the Repatriation,” State Tax
Notes, Apr. 23, 2018, p. 317.
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And the states have needs — including
infrastructure, rainy day funds, pension
shortfalls, and softening the blow of the
state and local tax cap. We certainly understand
why not all states pursued taxing the
repatriation, but virtually none? How can that
be?
One explanation is ideological, namely that
states with voters who liked the TCJA would
not wish to act in a way that is arguably
inconsistent with it. We have no idea if this is a
true explanation, but if it is then it signals part
of the problem. All politics is supposed to be
local, not national. If the federal government —
with its ability to deficit-finance — wants to
leave billions of dollars on the table, then it does
not follow that states should do the same.
Indeed, a thrifty and lean low-tax state, as many
so-called red states aspire to be, should be
especially wary of leaving money on the table.
These states wisely did not sit idly by and let
Quill enable particular remote sellers to erode
their sales tax bases, so why let some
corporations erode their corporate tax bases?
And then what of the so-called blue states?
A progressive personal income tax in Illinois is
a sensible reform, but how could there have
been no time for a quick repatriation bill? There
was certainly time for discussion of the SALT
cap workarounds in many blue states, but
taxing the repatriation could have been used to
soften the blow as well. Yet, crickets. And we
have not even gotten around to asking why
states have not conformed to the global
intangible low-taxed income or the base erosion
and antiabuse tax regimes or moved back to
worldwide mandatory combination, especially
now that it looks like the OECD is seriously
considering versions of it as to non-routine
profits.3

Perhaps when the next recession comes
states will be more thoughtful, but at that point,
the business community will argue that a
recession is a terrible time to raise taxes on
business and, in any event, taxes on profits will
not raise much revenue. In other words,
whatever combination of forces is stymieing
states now will likely remain formidable.
We will do our best to tackle the only part of
the problem that we can, which is to let states
know as clearly as possible that they are
missing relatively easy and sensible
opportunities to improve their tax systems.
To that end, we will return to the issue of the
repatriation. Clearly, states can still — and
4
should — conform to GILTI and the BEAT, but
can they still tax the repatriation? The answer is
yes. First, the generous structure of the
repatriation backloads when a taxpayer can
elect to have its earnings deemed returned.
Thus, a state can tax the 84 percent of
repatriation deemed returned for the next six
years for those taxpayers that elected to defer,
5
which we presume to be most if not all. The rate
applied to these revenues can be higher than the
rate applied to ordinary corporate revenues.
This can be justified as a kind of penalty/
attempt to recoup the time value of money.
Second, we think a state can go back and tax
the full repatriation as well.6 After all, the TCJA
gave the states a lot to respond to, and the
structure of the repatriation is such that
taxpayers will not suffer much harm to their
reliance interests if a state now taxes the
repatriation. The income was deemed returned
anyway — so the taxpayer could not have done
anything differently. Indeed, it is very unlikely
that the statute of limitations has run on any of
these tax years. A state could also justify its
delay by noting that there was a prominent
argument that the repatriated earnings would
come home and lead to an investment bonanza.

4

Shanske and Gamage, “States Should Conform to GILTI, Part 3:
Elevator Pitch and Q&A,” Tax Notes State, Oct. 14, 2019, p. 121.
5

IRC section 965(h)(1).

6

3

OECD, “Secretariat Proposal for a ‘Unified Approach’ Under Pillar
One” (2019).
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We owe this argument to Jordan Barry, though we fear that we do
not do it justice. See Jordan Barry, “The Transition (Under-) Tax”
(forthcoming). For a thorough discussion of the law of retroactivity, see
Michael T. Fatale, “Connecting Dot: Retroactive State Tax Statutes and
U.S. v. Carlton,” State Tax Notes, June 18, 2018, p. 1169.
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And so a state might have been waiting to tax
the bonanza. As has been well documented,
there has been no such investment flurry, just a
flurry of stock buybacks that advantage the
already advantaged.7 So there is another
reasonable reason for states to act now.
We conclude where we began. States and
localities are the primary providers of many
government services, such as public safety and
public schools. Though our federal system
assigns them substantial — and growing —
governmental responsibilities, the states are, to
a considerable extent, left on their own as to
raising revenues. No matter how much revenue
a state wishes to collect, all states should seek to
raise those revenues as fairly and efficiently as
possible. The TCJA has given states several
opportunities to raise revenue more fairly and
efficiently than many of their current revenue
tools, but so far the states have not acted. We
hesitate to say that we see any trends, but if one
squints then one might just see some signs that
states are stepping up.8


7

See, e.g., Nico Grant and Ian King, “Big Tech’s Big Tax Ruse: Industry
Splurges on Buybacks,” Bloomberg, Apr. 14, 2019 (“Some of the largest
U.S. technology companies pushed for a corporate tax overhaul in 2017
by suggesting they would go on hiring sprees and boost the economy.
Just over a year after getting what they wanted, data show these firms
gave most of their huge tax savings to investors.”); and Michael
Smolyansky, Gustavo Suarez, and Alexandra Tabova, “U.S.
Corporations’ Repatriation of Offshore Profits,” Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Sept. 4, 2018 (“The analysis detailed here
suggests that funds repatriated in 2018:Q1 have been associated with a
dramatic increase in share buybacks.”).
8

See Nebraska’s approach to the repatriation, Aaron Davis, “State
Won’t Treat Repatriated Income As Dividend,” Tax Notes State, Sept. 23,
2019, p. 1272; and New Hampshire’s approach to GILTI, Jennifer
McLoughlin, “Compromise Budget Deal Would Tax Some GILTI,” Tax
Notes State, Sept. 30, 2019, p. 1383.
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